The Karen National League, as a non-armed Karen organization, seeks to uplift the lot of the Karen people and bring about the rule of law and true democracy to Burma. It engages in any and all lawful activities incidental to the foregoing purposes.

BACKGROUND TO PEACE TALKS IN BURMA
By S'Aung Lwin, Bochum Germany, October 1992 Published by, BURMA ISSUES

INTRODUCTION

This document will attempt to explore the complicated dynamics lurking beneath the surface of possible peace talks in Burma, and hopes to clarify the role that government/opposition negotiations could play in: 1) achieving a cease fire agreement and an eventual end to the civil war which has debilitated the country for more than 40 years, 2) bringing about a national reconciliation of the various diverse ethnic minority groups seeking some form of self-determination within Burma, and 3) returning democracy to the country, and transferring power from the military dictatorship of the SLORC to the legitimate representatives elected by the Burmese people in 1990.

This paper particularly wants to highlight the Burmese central government's historic record of treachery, deception, and insincerity in offering "peace" talks to insurgent groups. It hopes to demonstrate the great need for caution and critical analysis in any attempt to structure fair and valid negotiations when dealing with the type of ruthless partner Rangoon has repeatedly proven to be. This paper also challenges the United Nations, and the international community in general, to change its regressive policies towards Burma, and take up its share of the responsibility in establishing democracy, self-determination, and human rights for the long-suffering Burmese people.

SLORC'S OFFER OF PEACE: REALITY OR ILLUSION?

On the 5th of May 1992, in a provocative editorial of the state-run Working People's Daily, Burma's ruling military junta(the State Law and Order Restoration Council a.k.a. "SLORC") appealed to the ethnic insurgent groups throughout Burma to lay down their arms, and join the regime in bringing about national reunification. It invited the various rebel factions, some of which have been battling Rangoon for over 40 years, to take "bold and positive steps" towards a cease fire agreement, encouraging them to seize a "golden opportunity" to establish national unity.(WPD, 5/5/92)

This offer of peace highlighted a series of seemingly conciliatory actions under General Than Shwe, who recently replaced previous SLORC chairman Saw Maung. These actions included the Burmese army's release of a handful of political prisoners, who were "deemed not a serious threat to national security"; the acceptance of the return of thousands of Burma's Muslim minorities who had recently fled over the border into Bangladesh; eased restrictions on imprisoned Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Ky; and the announcement of a cease fire in their war with ethnic Karen rebels, the strongest insurgent threat within Burma.

These unexpected signs of flexibility on the part of SLORC, while applauded by some members of the world community, have generated widespread concern and suspicion among both the Burman opposition and anti-Rangoon ethnic groups, who seriously question the sincerity and motivation behind such well-publicized political maneuvers. The crucial question remains unanswered - is SLORC sincere about the new face it is presenting to the world and the Burmese people, or is this simply another ploy of deception to gain international acceptance and remain in power?

NE WIN'S ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY

After the startling, nation-wide, pro-democracy uprising rumbled through Burma in the summer of 1988 with astonishing momentum, Ne Win, Burma's long-time military dictator, was suddenly forced to re-evaluate his previously cozy position in power. Knowing that the people would no longer accept one party rule under his reign, he resourcefully developed an alternative strategy which would ensure his continued grasp on power, but within a deceptively repackaged "new" format.

The Politics of Deception

To implement this "damage-control" strategy, he had the military stage a fake coup in September 1988, place the country under martial law, and establish a new governing body, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). He personally resigned as official head of state, and dissolved the notorious Burma Socialist Program Party(BSPP), which had ruled Burma since Ne Win's earlier coup in 1962. However, Ne Win continued to call the shots from behind the scenes, and the facade of the "new" SLORC government was nothing more than a reshuffling of the same BSPP military cronies who had formed Ne Win's oligarchy from the start.

The SLORC regime was purported to be only a transitional, care-taker government which would step aside once democratic elections were held to select new representatives to govern the country. To this end, new political parties were allowed to form and register, so that multi-party elections could be held. Burma's first contested elections since the 1950's were indeed held in May of 1990, resulting in a landslide victory for the opposition National League for Democracy(NLD) party. Not surprisingly, SLORC refused to recognize the overwhelmingly unfavorable results, and has yet to hand over power to the legitimately elected government of Burma, who's representatives are now in exile, in prison, co-opted or cowed by SLORC, or dead.

The Economics of Exploitation

Furthermore, Ne Win hoped that by eliminating the word "socialist" from the name of the ruling party, and the name of the country (formerly the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma - now "Myanmar", a decidedly chauvinist Burman appellation), he could convince his people, and the world, that a new open economy was being installed. Supposedly this new orientation would depart from the path that 26 years of economic mismanagement and ineptitude had taken Burma, now floundering among the ranks of the world's poorest nations, despite its vast natural wealth.

A slight freeing up of the economy has indeed allowed some foreign companies to invest in the country, but this has not led to a better life for the people. The economy remains centralized in the hands of the military elite, and profits still flow only into the pockets of a few top military leaders, where they are used to purchase more arms for Burma's oppressive army and police state.

The new economy has revealed itself to be nothing more than a rapid, wholesale sell-off of Burma's plentiful natural resources. These valuable raw materials are being unloaded at dirt-cheap prices to Asian and Western corporations eager to exploit SLORC's desperate security needs for foreign exchange currency. This economic trend benefits only the military and the corporations, but directly hurts the common people who suffer under a financially renewed SLORC, sustained by its ASEAN neighbors (particularly Thailand and Singapore), and irresponsible international investors from Europe, Japan, China, and the U.S.A, who are out to make a quick profit.

The environment and resource-rich land of Burma, and the long-term sustainability of Burmese economic growth, are equally ravaged by this unthinking rape of the natural landscape. These economic activities serve only the military's security purposes, and contribute significantly to SLORC's campaigns of brutal oppression against Burma's many ethnic groups(including many sectors of the majority Burman population). Simply changing the name of the ruling party and the country has done little to produce any authentic transformation of power or wealth in Burma.

SLORC'S GENOCIDAL WAR AGAINST THE OPPOSITION

Following the military coup of September 18, 1988, and the accompanying massacre which occurred (in which an estimated 8000 peaceful demonstrators were gunned down in the streets, and many more imprisoned), General Bo Mya (the leader of Karen National Union, the strongest ethnic insurgent group fighting the SLORC) appealed for peace talks with the Burmese junta via the Thai government. The junta rejected this offer outright, however. In fact, the Burmese regime has categorically stated that they will eliminate the opposition and the ethnic rebels, a policy verging on genocide, especially with regards to the various maltreated ethnic groups(Karen, Kachin, Shan, Chin etc.)

Major General Khin Nyunt, who is in charge of Burmese military intelligence, has proclaimed that "we shall continue to fight them [ethnic rebels] until they are eliminated." They have pledged to achieve this murderous objective through on-going military campaigns against the ethnic nationals and students who have been driven into the Burmese border areas, and through intimidation, detention, and torture of opposition leaders inside the country.

With this goal in mind, in 1990 the SLORC bought F-6 and F-7 bomber fighters, patrol boats, and light arms worth about US $1.5 billion from the neighboring dictatorship in China. Other countries that irresponsibly sold arms to the military junta include Germany (the Fritz Werner company), Singapore, Pakistan and Yugoslavia.

The Strategic War Against Ethnic Villagers

By the end of 1991 the military had launched all-out offensives against the ethnic nationals and the student-led opposition, especially in the Karen, Kachin and the Shan states.

In these areas, the Burmese Army targeted thousands of civilians suspected as potential rebel sympathizers. Ethnic villagers were driven out of their homes, creating a desperate internal refugee situation. Many other villagers were forcibly recruited by the army as porters, carrying heavy loads of food and ammunition through the jungle, under atrocious living conditions. Intentional malnutrition, repeated rape of the ethnic women, lack of medical treatment for widespread malaria, beatings, and arbitrary killings become standard operating procedure by the largely ethnic majority Burman army towards peasant ethnic minorities under their control.

The Burmese Army systematically relocated rural villagers into concentration camps and centralized army villages, in a technique derived from the notorious American "strategic hamlet" program, first implemented in Vietnam in the 1960's. The original ethnic villages were looted and burned, and life-sustaining rice crops and animal stocks destroyed. Harassment, torture, slave labor, and use of human mine detectors became daily realities for the common people, in what Amnesty International has termed "a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights.

Another technique used by the Burmese army to control the movement of the ethnic people in the area is to clear out large swathes of jungle forest area, especially along the Burmese-Thai border. Often the Army will follow Thai logging company operations, which build logging roads through the jungle, and attack ethnic resistance(most notably the Karen) from these useful routes. Environmental degradation and devastation often goes hand in hand with more direct human oppressions.

The Campaign to Capture Manerplaw

In late 1991, with the military's annual dry season offensive in full swing, Maj-General Khin Nyunt proudly announced that the army would take Manerplaw (jungle headquarters of the Karen and Burmese dissidents groups, including the government-in-exile) by March 27th.(Armed Forces Day). It required two months of heavy fighting just to capture the strategic nearby peak of Sleeping Dog Hill on March 14, at the cost of thousands of army causalities. Demoralized government soldiers were physically forced to press on, and many units were reportedly close to mutiny when they discovered that Manerplaw lay a long 10 km distance beyond the "Sleeping Dog" peak, not just below it as they had been led to believe.

Government forces were now supposedly poised to bombard Manerplaw with rockets, artillery, and air attacks. They soon discovered, however, that the rebel camp's strategically sheltered location between river and range frustrated their attempts to hit the mark, resulting in little more than a few damaged bamboo structures to show for their efforts. Manerplaw escaped largely unscathed.

Not only had the Karen nationals and the students resisted the army target date for capture, but they were now penetrating behind enemy lines. Armed resistance also continued deeper inside the country, around Toungoo, Papun, and Nyaunglebin. Thus, the seemingly unexpected Burmese declaration to halt military operations against the Karen National Union, the country's strongest guerrilla movement, was, in this context, not a total surprise. However, the declaration itself is dubious, because it was signed by Maj. General Maung Hla, who has been the over-all commander of the anti-Karen campaign since 1984, rather than by a higher-ranking senior officer. Previously, similar declarations were signed by Maj.Gen Khin Nyunt, considered to be Gen. Ne Win's hand-picked successor to SLORC's present chief Gen. Than Shwe.

A telling sign of the doubtful nature of SLORC's halt to military operations against the Karen, are the five army battalions that still remain around Hill 4044 or Sleeping Dog Hill. As the troops are only ten kilometers west of Manerplaw, they could easily launch a surprise attack at any time.(The Burmese Army has recently re-launched its attacks against the KNU, in the new 1992 dry-season campaign, despite recent public, international announcements that it has ceased it military operations against the Karen resistance)

PARALLELS FROM THE PAST: RANGOON'S PEACE TALK PLOYS

Several observers have pointed to the striking similarities between this current situation and that of 1978-79, when Rangoon abandoned a massive campaign against Panghsang, rebel headquarters of the Communist Party of Burma(CPB), after incurring heavy losses in taking the nearby Loi Hsiao Kao peak. A general amnesty for all armed opposition organizations was announced by the military regime in 1980, and peace talks were held with the Communist Party of Burma(CPB), and the Kachin Independence Organization(KIO), another significant ethnic insurgent group. This move also led many observers at that time to erroneously conclude that Rangoon was mellowing, an assumption that has sadly proven false in light of events. The peace talks at that time produced no results.

Many in the student opposition and ethnic groups believe the development of government "peace" offers both then and now is just a deceptive political ploy to cling on to power, when military campaigns have stalled out. They would cast strong doubts onto whether the SLORC "finally has had a swift change of heart", and is truly sincere in its bid to resolve national ethnic problems or transfer power to a civilian, democratically-elected government. They cite their decades long experience of armed struggle against the central government, which has been marked by many bitter experiences with the intransigence, insincerity, hostility, and unbendingly militant stance of the military junta, to support this skeptical viewpoint.

Dr. Em Martha, a KNU spokesperson, commented on the suspension of the armed offensive against the Karen by saying, "We can never trust the Burmese military. In the past we have had three or four peace talks with them, but they only tricked us. These people (SLORC) will be no different from their predecessors."

SLORC's International PR Campaign

Peter Limbin is the foreign minister of the parallel, elected government-in-exile, the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma(NCGUB), which is headquartered at Manerplaw along the Thai-Burmese border. He and many other observers inside and outside the country, believe that Burma's strongman, Gen.Ne Win, continues to pull the strings behind the scenes of the SLORC, despite his announced "retirement" in mid 1988. Limbin credits the octogenarian for masterminding the whole "well-planned political move" of 1988 to "cheat the world community" of long overdue justice in Burma. Limbin added that recently the world has become more aware of the gravity of Burmese problems after the much publicized influx of over 200,000 Burmese Muslim refugees into Bangladesh, and the Burmese Army's all out offensive against the Karen. "Rangoon was fast to divert world attention away from these two issues, being fully aware that Dhaka (Bangladesh's capital) could possibly seek intervention and resolution from the UN Security Council if the refugee problem could not be resolved," commented Limbin. He further added that his parallel government was also mobilizing international efforts to unseat the SLORC from its UN seat, as it is not a "legitimate" and "democratically elected" government, which the NCGUB is. Because of this issue, the SLORC does not want to draw unwanted attention from UN observers.

It is quite clear that the SLORC maneuvers do not indicate a sincere stance of compromise. Opposition groups view the political prisoners who were recently released, including aging former prime minister U Nu, as "snakes without poison" or "not politically active", leaving more formidable critics of the SLORC still under detention.

Furthermore, Limbin and his colleague U Hla Pe, who is information minister in the NCGUB government, strongly question SLORC's sincerity, pointing out its failure to honor its pre-election pledge to step down, and hand over power to elected MPs. They believe the SLORC will continue to defend its military control and very existence as necessary, by prolonging the process of the national convention to draft a new constitution. At the same time it will attempt to establish a "puppet government", to appease the international community, from out of the remaining cowed and intimidated elected legislators from the 1990 election, those who remained inside Burma. Out of the 485 national seats, 106 MPs have already been disqualified (seven deceased, 79 are under detention, and the remaining 20 are either in exile or in the NCGUB parallel government).

The SLORC's recent series of announcements are not true signs that peace, unity, and democracy will soon return to the impoverished Burmese nation. Experience shows that its promises have always been broken, and its pledges never honored. In fact, the Burmese junta has never indicated a time frame under which it would begin to fade out of political power. Even more importantly, it has never shown a serious desire to once and for all resolve(or at least discuss) peacefully the national political conflicts springing form the historic Burman oppression of ethnic minorities, like the Karen and others.

The Karen Experience and Viewpoint

So why should opposition groups like the Karen risk being trapped into fraudulent "peace" talks with SLORC? General Bo Mya of the Karen National Union(KNU), who is a staunch christian and a fighter for Karen self-determination for more than 40 years, was not surprised by the SLORC's announcements, and believes them to be a face saving measure for Rangoon in the wake of the heavy casualties the Burmese Army suffered in its five month offensive against the Karen headquarters of Manerplaw last year.

Ever since the Japanese invasion of Burma during WW 2, the Karen people have faced persecution by the Burmese military which continues unabated up to the present moment. At present most of the Karen ethnic villages on the east bank of the Salween River have been burned down, and many Karens have been forced to flee to the border and inside Thailand. Although well aware that the military junta is insincere and not to be trusted, the KNU general, Bo Mya, in seeing the desperate plight of his people, announced he was willing to have peace talks with SLORC for the sake of his suffering ethnic community. General Bo Mya has said his Karen National Union, along with other Burmese dissidents and armed ethnic groups, were ready to attend peace talks with Rangoon, but the forum needed to be held in a neutral third country, and in the presence of UN representatives.

He reiterated that the Karen can hardly trust the sincerity of the junta, as the Karens have been tricked in previous peace negotiations. The bulk of previous peace negotiations turned out to be nothing more than propaganda campaigns for Rangoon. Bo Mya attributed Rangoon's recent unexpected signs of liberalization to be a result of increasingly strong pressure and criticism from the international community, as well as stemming from its military losses in attacking the Karen guerrillas. Peace talks would provide the good international publicity needed by the discredited Rangoon government to relieve some of this pressure.

The Peace Talks of 1963: The Opposition's Painful Lesson

Lessons from the past have taught the Burmese opposition that a peace-through-negotiation policy, when advocated by the military government, should be given a second thought(and third and fourth). In the past, several peace negotiations between the military government and opposition groups - including ethnic minorities and the Communist Party of Burma(CPB) - have been held.

On the 11th of July, 1963, the Revolutionary Council(military government) of Ne Win offered to meet and negotiate with all the various rebel groups. At that time the military government said the talks would be held in a free environment, without any preconditions. When the talks started, however, the military immediately demanded that all the armed groups lay down their weapons, and accept the "Burmese Way to Socialism", Ne Win's philosophical foundation for the ruling BSPP party and the Burmese economy. Whatever issues the opposition delegates presented for discussion were simply ignored.

The military junta insisted that the ethnic groups and the communists forget about the past, and simply look forward to the bright political future of the country, as envisioned by the BSPP. But Yebaw Htay, a delegate from the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), responded, "to forget the past history" would mean covering up the whole history of Burma, particularly the reasons the people were forced to go underground and take up arms in the first place. "We need to evaluate and learn from the past. Then only can we be able to work towards a long lasting peace and for the well being of the people and the country", said Htay. But the military rejected his idea, fearing their past mistakes would be exposed in the process of historical examination. The first round of peace talks were held on the 8th of October 1963, and the second round on the 10th. After the second round it became clear to the opposition that the peace talks were going nowhere, and the government was not serious in its offer.

Before the peace talks were concluded on the 14th of November, 1963, the Karen delegate, Mahn Ba Zan, informed the military that he supported a continuation of the discussion of the historical roots of the Burmese crisis, and hoped an agreement ending the civil war and leading towards the goal of national unity, could be achieved. Unfortunately, the military decided that the talks had stalemated, and told the rebels they better prepare for a return to the jungle.

At the conclusion of the talks, the military's promise that it would not attack the opposition delegates for three days after the end of the negotiations became a bone of contention, as it appeared the government might break its fair play agreement. Thakin Tin Tun of the CPB, Saw Sagawleitaw (Karen), and Mahn Ba Zan (Karen) discussed this serious concern among themselves. The military demanded that November 15th, the day the delegates were to leave Rangoon, be considered the first day of the agreed upon three-day grace period during which they would not attack the returning delegates. But the Karen delegates wanted the first day to be the day they arrived at "Yethogyi" village, east of Toungoo, because their return trip from Rangoon to Yethogyi village would require two days of travel, making it impossible for them to reach a safe area in one more day. The government rejected these concerns.

The delegates returned to the jungle in four separate groups on the 15th. Among the four groups the KNUP, KNPP, and the CPB groups were all attacked on their way back, on the 17th of November by three Burmese regiments. Luckily the leaders were not hurt and reached their camps in the jungle safely.

Government Treachery and the KRC

One of the delegate groups, the Karen Revolutionary Council (KRC), surrendered to the military in the hope of working together with the government for the betterment of the Karen people. The group's leader was Mooso Kawkasa, and other members included Saw Ba Htun, Bo Lin Htin, and Bo Trueman. As it turned out, they were all manipulated by the military as useful tools for their deceptive propaganda. Later, the military turned on the group and placed Mooso Kawkasa under house arrest in Rangoon for the rest of his life. In his last words to the Karen people before his death, he bitterly warned them never to trust the Burmese military regime. He discovered the hard way that the BSPP never keeps their promises, and advised the Karen not to repeat his painful mistake in the future.

Bo Lin Htin, another member of the KRC group and a well-known Karen freedom fighter, was used by the government in a military campaign against the KNUP/KNPP(other Karen rebel factions) in the Moulmein area, which previously had been controlled by his own rebel group. Though Bo Lin Htin tried in his own way to bring peace to his people, he was tricked by the lies of the Burmese military, and later treacherously killed by them. (It is reportedly known that Bo Lin Htin was killed by the present Burmese ambassador to Thailand, U Nyunt Shwe.)

SLORC Treachery and the CPM

In 1990 the military junta initiated a secret meeting with a small but politically strong opposition group who's leader was the brother of one of the most well known Burmese woman writers - Daw Khin Myo Chit. His name is Yebaw Lwin (a.k.a. Bo Thein Aung). He was a former Central Committee member of the Communist Party of Burma(CPB), but now led the "Communist Party of Myanmar"(CPM). The government offered the CPM several important concessions to their desire for a form of autonomy. Yebaw Lwin and 47 members of the CPM were persuaded to come forward into the military-controlled area for a peaceful negotiation. When the delegation arrived at the military area all of them were arrested immediately, and sent to Mandalay prison. Most are being tortured, and some have even died in jail. Through incidents like this one, the opposition quickly discovered the Burmese military regime's insincerity towards the ethnic minorities and dissident groups, many of whom returned to the jungle to resume the armed struggle.

Gen. Chavalit and the Opposition Peace Offer The present 1992 peace talks offer made by the Burmese military had already been called for by the ethnic minorities and the Burmese opposition in 1990, through the channel of the Thai General Chavalit, who has close ties with the Burmese junta. At that time the military flatly rejected the call for peace. Lt.Col Kyaw Myint, a Burmese officer stationed near Maesot (a Thai border town), even commented that the military will not guarantee the safety of the rebel groups, even if they wanted to lay down their arms in good faith and talk with the SLORC. So, as one can quickly see, the opposition in Burma has many reasons not to trust the government in Rangoon when it starts proclaiming peace for the nation.

SLORC, THE WA/KOKANG CEASE FIRE, AND THE DRUG TRADE

The military has dealt secretly with some armed groups along the China-Burma border, however,(the Wa and Kokang ethnic groups) and managed to sign cease-fire agreements with them in exchange for government concessions to their demands for: a) recognition as lawful organizations, b) the right to retain their armies without interference from the SLORC, and c) control of their own territories. In addition to these concessions, these groups were allowed to continue their involvement in the lucrative northeastern drug trade in heroin. The leaders of these armed groups include ex-CPB commanders like Phon Kyar Shin(Kokang), Phon Kyar Phu, Kyauk Mi Hlaing (Wa), and Kyauk Khun Hsar (Maing Yan/Maing Khat), all of whom are now heavily involved with the drug trade. The KIA 4th Brigade(a Kachin rebel army) also signed a peace accord with the Slorc under the same concessions mentioned above.

One interesting aspect of these developments is that these same three demands were made by the Communist Party of Burma in 1981, but the military junta rejected them at the time, claiming it violated the Ne Win dictated Constitution of 1974. Presently most of these groups are no longer politically active, but are focused mainly on the booming drug trade in poppy production. Even if a democratic government were to gain power in Burma, there would be a lot of difficulties in bringing these groups inside the orbit of the law.

Some observers speculate that, through its unusual concessions, SLORC hopes to develop a close relationship with these profit-generating, drug-running groups, as preparation for the potential establishment of a future defense stronghold in the north, in the event that they lose power and are forced to turn over the government to democratic representatives. Presently, the military has found these connections very useful in bringing in around 1.5 billion US$ worth of arms and ammunition from their northeastern neighbor China. These weapons have been used effectively in SLORC attacks against the Kachin, Karen, and other armed rebel forces opposing them in other parts of the country. The SLORC also reportably takes a slice of the lucrative drug trade through under the table taxes on opium/heroin exports.

THE IMBALANCE OF POWER IN BURMA

All and all, these experiences of SLORC treachery and blatant deception should cause the ethnic minorities and the Burmese opposition to look at government offers for peaceful negotiations with a highly critical and careful eye. The central problem in the past has been the opposition's failure to recognize the significant imbalance of power between the government and the opposition groups.

Despite the turbulence and ongoing insurgencies rampant throughout the country, the military regime has always been able to maintain its "top dog" position in both the military and political fields. The opposition groups, in contrast, have always been in an inferior position. As the CPM episode highlighted above reveals, it is very difficult, and often dangerous, to negotiate from the position of an underdog, especially in dealing with a historically ruthless regime like Ne Win's, which has little respect for human rights.

However, the imbalanced power differential between the military junta and the armed opposition groups changed dramatically with the added variable of the nation-wide, student-led democratic uprisings of 1988. This massive, spontaneous, society-wide movement paved the way for the formation of a stronger and more broadly based opposition organization, the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB).

All opposition groups must realize that, in the military arena, the SLORC will never give up its offensive capability to destroy, as long as it continues to acquire a steady flow of arms from the world market. One should not forget that SLORC is simply "the same wine in a new bottle", a reshuffled composition of the same, old BSPP-dominated military, with the same old dictator, Ne Win, pulling the strings from behind the curtain. More importantly the opposition should not forget the words of the present chairman of SLORC, Than Shwe, on the 22nd of May, 1991 in Bangkok. At that time Shwe revealed that, in the government's mind, "There is no sign yet to transfer the power to the civilian government in the near future". In this instance, we should take the government at its word.

SLORC's present gesture of peaceful reconciliation is designed to divide and then eliminate the opposition groups in Manerplaw, the capital of Burma's democratic forces. The "divide and conquer" strategy has been used effectively by many a despot since the time of the Roman Empire. Unless, all the rebel factions can form a united front, and call the rest of the world to a policy of non-cooperation, economically and militarily, with the SLORC, the power equation will continue to favor Rangoon, and no real change will occur in Burma.

THE UN AND OBSTACLES TO PEACE IN BURMA

Because of the forty-three year of civil war in Burma, thousands of Burmese refugees have ended up fleeing to Thailand, but up to now the UN hasn't recognized them as official refugees, and has done nothing concrete to help ease their sufferings. This refugee problem does not even account for the thousands more internal refugees inside Burma, who's situation is even more desperate, and who receive even less international recognition or aid. Their suffering and dying is done in silence and anonmynity.

Furthermore, the UN still continues to recognize the illegitimate stranglehold the military(SLORC) has on power in Burma, disregarding the May 1990 elections by the Burmese people, who selected a democratic government to lead the country into a new era. By allowing SLORC to continue to hold a seat in the UN, the world community is indirectly condoning the terrible atrocities the government of Burma regularly commits against its ethnic minorities and other dissidents from all walks of life, including Buddhist monks, and young students.

How long must the Burmese people wait for the UN to take action on their behalf, and uphold its internationally recognized mandate to uphold human rights worldwide? Must they wait till all have become refugees? Or will the UN move in only when the whole country is in ruins? Why has it intervened worldwide in unjust and violent situations like Cambodia, Yugoslavia, and Kuwait, yet done nothing for the long suffering people of Burma? With a new, activist secretary general, the UN should take this as a "golden opportunity"(in the words of SLORC) to help bring peace to Burma.

A VISION FOR VALID PEACE TALKS IN BURMA

In spite of many bitter peace talk experiences with the Burmese central government, almost everyone in the opposition would accept a peaceful resolution to Burma's political problems, were such an option genuinely possible. If both sides would come to the table with a true sincerity about working for the national reconciliation of Burma, than at long last peace will come to Burma's war-torn countryside. For the opposition's personal safety, and if any binding agreement is to be reached, these peace talks must take place in a neutral third country, and in the presence of UN observers and the international media. Only in this way will SLORC be held accountable to its promises, and the opposition be in a situation of security.

In all previous peace talks, news of what was transpiring was blacked out, and kept from the Burmese people. The majority of Burmese didn't even know that negotiations were taking place, let alone what had been discussed, and why they had failed. Only when the Burmese people and the world are allowed to know what is going on in the negotiations will it become clear who has come to the talks with a sincere heart and who has come with deceptive designs. Perhaps some internationally respected figure or body, like former US president Jimmy Carter, or the UN, could serve as the mediator and organizer of the peace talks, and insure fair treatment for both sides.

A Location for the Talks

But where should these talks be held? If there is a South East Asian country willing to play host for the peace talks, this would be acceptable. Unfortunately, most of the ASEAN nations, and especially Burma's closest neighbors in Thailand, Singapore etc., have supported the junta economically and militarily, rather than siding with the oppressed people of Burma in their costly struggle for democracy. Because of this sad fact, it is likely that talks would need to be held outside of the ASEAN region. Many see Europe as the most appropriate site for peace talks. Nations such as France, Switzerland, Austria or Norway would be acceptable.

Preconditions for Talks to Begin

The central question remaining is, what steps need to be taken before valid peace talks can begin?

Essential Participants in the Talks Another crucial question is, who will attend the peace talks? The peace talks delegation should be composed of representatives from the following groups:

Observer groups should include:

CONCLUSION: A CALL FOR INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT

The Burmese people have suffered the pains and hurts of a devastating civil war for more than forty years. They have tried their best to resolve the long standing ethnic problems, and lack of general democracy in various ways, ranging from peaceful resistance to armed rebellion. Many Burmese people have sacrificed their bodies, lives, homes, families, friends, careers, studies, businesses, freedom, and normal lifestyle in their long and continuing struggle for self-determination, democracy, and a better way of life. They have done more than their share of the work for peace, and are now looking to the outside world to take up its responsibility and join them in their demands for human rights. They desperately need the effective help and coordination of international communities, friends, organizations, governments, NGOs, and the United Nations to move in with a concerted and maximum effort to bring about genuine peace and reconciliation in Burma, and an end to oppression and injustice. The Burmese people deeply desire to rejoin the international community with dignity, and enjoy the peace and prosperity of other nations. In order for this to happen the rest of the world needs to join Burma in its struggle against the military dictatorship of SLORC and Ne Win.

Burma Issues PO Box 1076, Silom Post Office Bangkok 10504 Thailand

 

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