The End of the "Buffer Zone" The End of the "Buffer Zone" Thailand Security Policies towards Burma's Armed Opposition Groups By Saw BJ Kawhtoo Thai national security policies towards Burma’s armed opposition groups have changed drastically since the end of the 1980s. The two major factors that underpin such a development are the gradual loss of military strength by Burma’s ethnic groups and also the volatility of internal and external threats to Thai national security. Security policies in Thailand used to be primarily based upon the analogy of “Bamboo bending with the wind.” From this analogy, the Thai government adopted the so-called “Buffer Zone” policy, which considered the military strength and capacity of the ethnic armed groups based along the Thai-Burma border to be used to safeguard its border with Burma. The benefits of such a policy were two fold. Firstly, it prevented a Burmese army invasion onto Thai soil, and secondly it neutralized the remaining threat of Thai communists based in the North by utilizing armed ethnic groups as shields. However, Thai policy makers operated a major shift in strategy in the early 1990s due to the geo-political evolution of external and internal threats. By the end of 1980s, for instance, Thai communist movements were no longer a threat to Thailand’s national security. Besides, the massive deployment of Cambodian and Vietnamese troops along the Thai North East border and the Thai-Lao conflict, once considered external threats, were no longer significant in the context of Thailand national security in the 1990s. At that time, there were major policy reviews in the army, part of this addressed the fact that Thailand no longer needed assistance from Burmese insurgents in countering the communist threat. Moreover, at the same time, Burma’s ethnic armed groups were continuously losing their controlled territory due to heavy offensives from the Burmese army launched in early 1990s. The inability of the insurgent groups to protect Thailand from the Burmese army’s intrusion set an alarming signal to many Thai security authorities to re-examine national security policy towards their informal insurgent allies. In 1989, when Army Commander in Chief, General Chavalit Yongchaiyuth, negotiated logging and fishery deals with the Burmese regime, the buffer zone policy was completely abandoned. As part of the deal, Rangoon demanded in return that the Thai government stop all border trade and aid to ethnic insurgent troops. This radical move significantly undermined the financial stability of ethnic insurgent troops who were depending mostly on informal border trade to fund their military operations. Moreover, as part of the deal the Thai government had with Rangoon, the Thai army even intentionally allowed on an occasional basis, the Burmese troops to enter Thailand for military objectives when attacking ethnic military outposts. In addition, armed ethnic leaders started to face increasing restrictions on their movements on Thai soil. As well as this, the purchasing of military surplus from the black market became more difficult than ever. Although the Thai security policy has constantly been reviewed, policy implementation always remains a tough challenge. Indeed, cooperation between policy makers in Bangkok and frontline regional army commanders when dealing with border intrusions was often inefficient and fragile because policies formulated in Bangkok were usually in contradiction with the reality faced by frontline army leaders who were dealing with invasive Burmese troops on regular basis. Indeed it is far more frequent that Burmese troops don’t ask permission to enter Thailand to attack insurgent groups. This contradiction also resulted in poor coordination among security agencies. For instance, Gen. Wattanachai Chaimuenwong of the Thai National Third Army, once known as one of the most professional Thai General, frequently refused orders from Bangkok central government when dealing with drug traffickers and Burmese army invasions. Eventually, under the Thaksin administration, he was promoted and removed from his Third Army Command assumedly because of his tough stance against Burma. Furthermore, the Task Force 339, a special Thai army unit responsible for drug eradication which was jointly formed with US support, was also abolished under Thaksin’s government, allegedly to appease the regime in Burma. In 2002, in his weekly radio announcement, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, officially announced that Thailand would stop fostering buffer zones made up of minority people living along the Burmese border, a move that provoked criticism from many Thai academics. Despite this shift of policy, both Thailand and Burma continue to deploy today regular army along the border. Border conflicts, human and drug trafficking, and the epidemic of transmitted diseases due to the influx of illegal immigrants continue to jeopardize Thai national security. Although the buffer zone policy is no longer in place, on the other hand, low rank Thai army and intelligent officers continue to maintain informal relationships with armed opposition groups, mainly for intelligence gathering purposes. In fact, many ex-insurgent soldiers are recruited into Thai intelligence units, mostly in units where the need to monitor Burmese army activities in Burmese language is extremely significant for the Thai army. Needless to say, the withdrawal of the “Buffer Zone” policy causes more harm than good to the fragile Thai national security. However, so long as the Thai leaders enjoy economic privileges from the Burmese regime, Thai national security will be constantly eroded and undermined. Not only is the flooding of drugs such as methamphetamine into Thai soil a threat to human security, but the widespread presence of Burmese intelligence officers into Thailand is not a good prospect for Thailand’s national security as a whole. Besides the Burmese Embassy in Bangkok that has been closely monitoring, Thailand’s internal and external security for years, it has been assumed that many high rank Burmese intelligence officers have been assigned to big cities and minor towns along the border, to provide intelligence, not only about the Thai government but also about the movements of Burma opposition groups. Maybe, many Thai nationals who are lucky enough to own a business benefits greatly from cheap labour thanks to the arrival en masse of Burmese migrant workers, but the influx of Burmese nationals in various parts of Thailand can pose a threat to the Thai national security as well as human security. It has long been suspected by Burmese insurgent groups that many Burmese intelligence officers are working in various Thai labour sectors. This type of Burmese intelligence officer is assigned to provide ground information to the Burmese government on a regular basis. However, it has been a major difficulty for both Thai authorities and Burmese insurgent groups to distinguish who are Burmese civilians and who are the Burmese intelligence officers among these labours. Of importance, Thailand long term solutions for national and human security issues are still vague. Thailand alone can not solve the security threats from Burma without recognizing that ethnic groups play some role in Thailand’s National security arena. Ultimately, Thailand must also realize that so long as civil war persists in Burma, there will be continuous security and social consequences, it will have to deal with. Therefore, in considering the long term solutions for its national security, Thailand should assist the ethnic insurgent groups to seek for political reconciliation with the Burmese regime rather than to see them as mere intelligence sources providing information on low level activity. For a long term, secure, profitable relationship between Thailand and Burma, there needs to be national reconciliation. With this in mind, acknowledgement of the ethnic groups as major political players is crucial. To this end, Thai officials need to engage with ethnic leader in a more constructive manner. Nevertheless, whether the Thai government opts to work with ethnic opposition groups to tackle the root causes of the crisis in Burma and issues relating to Thailand national security, or with the Burmese regime to maintain the status quo, is likely to depend upon who has the most to offer -economically- to the Thai policy makers. ~